Duhem’s viewpoint about physics is a systematic and mathematical one that surely somehow has effected to his philosophical explanation of SCIENTIFIC theories. For Duhem, the aim of science is classifying the phenomena in a good mathematical frame in which it could identify the real relationships among the theoretical identities without manifesting them. Theories are not only full boxes of phenomena classified tools that are proper for today and improper for tomorrow. The most important characteristic of a SCIENTIFIC theory is to predict phenomena and experimental laws that is not discovered, but what is effective in this novels predict is the relationship between identities. In the view of ontology, SCIENTIFIC theories make no commitment for theoretical identities. In spite that Duhem is a SCIENTIFIC historian, and by searching in his works and ideas we can’t clearly say Duhem is the realist or the instrumenalist about SCIENTIFIC theories. Even some believe that he is tried to find a way between REALISM and instumentalism. In this paper, at first Duhem ideas about the aim and structure of physical theory will be surveyed. Then by some pro and opponent ideas with Duhem's REALISM we will demonstrate his idea about SCIENTIFIC theories has more tendencies to structure REALISM.

By appealing to the no-miracle argument (NM), SCIENTIFIC realists claim that the approximate truth of SCIENTIFIC theories and the existence of their postulated entities are the cause of the predictive and explanatory success of science. Antirealists, however, by appealing to the pessimistic meta-induction argument (PMI), claim that a lot of past predictively successful and yet false theories show that there is not any relationship between success of a theory and its truth. One of the most influential responses of realists to PMI is Structural REALISM, proposed by John Worral. The aim of this thesis is to show that during theory-shift there has been a continuity at the structural or formal level, and the central terms of successive theories refer to the same entities (structures). In the first part of this paper NM and PMI will be explained. Then, a critical evaluation of structural REALISM is given in both epistemological and ontological versions. It will be shown that this thesis is unable to rebut PMI conclusively. The conclusion of this paper, however, is that PMI cannot work against structural realists’ thesis if they limit the domain of their claim to existential sentences of SCIENTIFIC theories, to what I call “Existential REALISM.”

One of the most significant topics in the philosophy of science literature is the debate between SCIENTIFIC REALISM and anti-REALISM. In recent years, a considerable amount of literature has emerged on SCIENTIFIC progress accounts. The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between SCIENTIFIC REALISM/anti-REALISM and SCIENTIFIC progress accounts. SCIENTIFIC REALISM, in this article, refers to epistemic REALISM, which posits that mature and successful SCIENTIFIC theories offer an (approximately) true description of the world. In contrast, advocates of epistemic anti-REALISM reject the possibility of acquiring knowledge about unobservable entities. SCIENTIFIC progress accounts fall into four categories based on their intended purpose: epistemic, semantic, problem-solving (functional), and noetic. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic accounts, which rely on the concept of truth, are based on SCIENTIFIC REALISM. The problem-solving account is considered an anti-realistic approach since it replaces the criterion of truth with the ability to solve problems. The primary argument of this article is that although the noetic account appears to use the concept of truth in its explanation, it prioritizes understanding over truth in determining the preferred theory. This means that the criterion for selecting the preferred theory is not approximation to the truth, but rather understanding. As a result, the noetic account is based on an anti-realistic approach.   Introduction The thesis of epistemic REALISM posits that successful and mature SCIENTIFIC theories are (approximately) true. Also, various accounts of SCIENTIFIC progress focus on specific objectives within science. This article argues that the epistemic and semantic approaches align with a realist perspective, while the problem-solving (functional) and noetic accounts have anti-realist foundations. SCIENTIFIC REALISM Generally, three theses of SCIENTIFIC REALISM can be identified: the metaphysical (ontological) thesis, the semantic thesis, and the epistemic thesis. The metaphysical thesis asserts that the world exists independently of the mind. The semantic thesis claims that propositions concerning unobservable entities can be evaluated as true or false implying that all SCIENTIFIC propositions have meaning whether they relate to observable or unobservable entities. The epistemic REALISM thesis argues that we can acquire knowledge about reality including knowledge about unobservable entities. To be more precise, the claims about theoretical entities in SCIENTIFIC theories are not only meaningful but also provide an almost true depiction of reality. In this article, REALISM refers specifically to epistemic REALISM, which encompasses three main aspects: 1) the existence of a mind-independent world, 2) the attribution of truth or falsity to SCIENTIFIC propositions concerning unobservable entities, and 3) the claim that the propositions in mature SCIENTIFIC theories regarding theoretical entities are nearly true. On the other hand, one advocate of epistemic anti-REALISM is Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. According to this perspective, van Fraassen denies the capacity to acquire knowledge about unobservable levels. In this view, the goal of science is not truth but rather empirical adequacy. This means that the objective of SCIENTIFIC endeavor is not to uncover the truth, but rather to construct models that are empirically sufficient. SCIENTIFIC progress accounts Regarding the concept of SCIENTIFIC progress, four accounts have been presented. In the epistemic account, the goal of science is to increase knowledge or justified true belief. Therefore, SCIENTIFIC progress occurs as we accumulate knowledge. In the semantic account, the objective of science is to approach closer to the truth (verisimilitude). This implies that science progresses when our theories are more truth-like. In the problem-solving (functional) approach, the concept of truth is set aside, and the focus shifts to problem-solving or fulfilling specific functions within science. In this account, SCIENTIFIC progress is marked by the development of new theories that effectively solve more problems compared to previous ones. In the new functional approach, SCIENTIFIC progress is defined in terms of the usefulness of the problem-defining and problem-solving. Advocates of the noetic account consider increased understanding to be the goal of science. In other words, science advances when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world. SCIENTIFIC progress accounts and SCIENTIFIC REALISM In both the epistemic and semantic accounts, truth plays a pivotal role. Justified true belief serves as a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. In the epistemic account, it is possible to acquire knowledge about theoretical entities. Thus, we can infer that the epistemic account is rooted in SCIENTIFIC REALISM. In the semantic account, the ultimate aim of science is to achieve complete truth. While achieving complete truth in theories may not be certain within this approach, it is possible to demonstrate their approximate truth. Therefore, according to this account, mature SCIENTIFIC theories are considered to be almost true. Consequently, this account aligns with SCIENTIFIC REALISM. In presenting the problem-solving approach, Laudan explicitly argues against truth being the objective of science, as there is no criterion available to gauge the attainment of truth. In other words, if we define the success of SCIENTIFIC theories based on their ability to solve SCIENTIFIC problems, this success does not necessarily indicate the truth of the theory. While mature SCIENTIFIC theories may demonstrate success and possess the capability to solve numerous problems in comparison to earlier theories, this accomplishment does not directly correlate to the truthfulness of the theory. Consequently, this approach adopts an anti-realist perspective towards science. In the noetic account, priority is given to understanding over approximation to the truth, despite the presence of both criteria. To clarify further, if there are two competing theories, with one being more aligned with reality but the other providing a greater level of understanding, the second theory is considered preferable. Moreover, the concept of the model in the noetic approach resembles the concept of the model in the doctrine of constructive empiricism. This implies that SCIENTIFIC theories do not necessarily provide a true depiction of the world, but rather act as models designed to enhance our understanding. This perspective on SCIENTIFIC theories is anti-realist since it contradicts the thesis of epistemic REALISM, which asserts that mature SCIENTIFIC theories offer an (almost) true description of the world. Conclusion In summary, this article puts forth the following assertions: l The epistemic and semantic accounts offer explanations for SCIENTIFIC progress within the framework of SCIENTIFIC REALISM. l The problem-solving (functional) account takes an anti-realist standpoint by explicitly discarding the notion of truth. Although some argue that the new functional approach can be classified as a realistic perspective, the article contends that it still remains anti-realist. l The noetic account inherently embraces an anti-realist position. It considers SCIENTIFIC theories as models that prioritize enhancing understanding rather than providing a relatively accurate description of the world.  

Causal theories of reference in the philosophy of language and philosophy of science have suggested that it could resolve lingering worries about incommensurability between theoretical claims in different paradigms, to borrow Kuhn's terms. If we co-refer throughout different paradigms, then the problems of incommensurability are greatly diminished. This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to SCIENTIFIC REALISM by the semantic incommensurability thesis. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued by Philip Kitcher. Having Kitcher's theory of reference discussed, we will argue that it fails to distinguish genuine case of continuity of reference and cases of discontinuity.

Kyle Stanford poses a new challenge to SCIENTIFIC REALISM, known as the new pessimistic induction. According to him, for every SCIENTIFIC theory, there are "unconceived alternative theories" that go beyond the understanding of scientists; Therefore, one can never be realistic about the unobservable entities of theories. This article tries to defend SCIENTIFIC REALISM against Stanford's argument by emphasizing the convergence of successful theories in the history of science. This article emphasizes that under the new pessimistic induction, given the unlimited number of unconceived alternative theories to any successful theory, the possibility of "matching" and "unifying" independent theories will be very unlikely. Whereas in the history of science, we see frequent examples of successful theories being linked. We also try to defend the idea of convergence against critiques.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM is the view that our best SCIENTIFIC theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates on this view between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. In this essay, we examine the core principles of the realist position, and indicate some reasons in the conflict with its rivals.

Photographic REALISM has a history as long as photography. It has always been seen that photographers, theorists, philosophers, semiologists and others, directly or indirectly, have written or spoken about this matter. However, this issue is still open and controversial. REALISM, in its philosophical definition, is affirmation of entities independent of our thoughts and senses. The process of photography, in itself, is a suitable place for incarnation of this attitude. The photography, by its realistic nature, opens two window into the world: one, in the follow of our vision but through suggestion of various contiguities,other, for development and expansion of our knowledge. The perceptual REALISM proposes that the objects of our environment are subjects of our perception,that is, the thing we perceive with our senses has real and objective existence and is independent of our perceptions. The conceptual REALISM is a matter about real existence of genera. In SCIENTIFIC REALISM, it is supposed that objects of confirmed theories, including unobservable entities, exist objectively. In fact, SCIENTIFIC REALISM, to discover of unobservable entities, enters to fields like metaphysics, semantics, and epistemology, respectively, to assert that the world has certain natural structure and mind-independent, to explain that SCIENTIFIC theories have face-value and truth-conditioned descriptions of observable and unobservable things, and to claim epistemologically that mature and predictively successful SCIENTIFIC theories are well-confirmed and approximately true of the world. When we speak about authenticity in photography, two important subjects appears to need most attention: the medium of photography and the photographer. As much as it concerns to the latter, intentionality of the photographer, politics of representation, mainstream culture of the era, demands and needs of audience/viewer, opportunities and challenges, and so on, can lead to different conclusions. The former, which is related to recording tool, has always been confronted with objective and pure recording of reality. In other words, the so-called photographic REALISM follows the expectation which believes that photograph is something the real viewer sees no difference between that and his/her lived and perceived reality. In photography, perceptual REALISM involves similarity of the object of a photograph to one’s visual perception of the same object, to say that, something beyond confirmation of a thing’s existence in front of the camera— likeness. This likeness needs to be free of any infer of human agent in mechanical recording. The SCIENTIFIC approach in photography believes that this medium, with relying on its technological abilities, can discover act as an assistant to our visual perception system and make the unobservable observable. In this paper, it is attempted to study the perceptual and the SCIENTIFIC in photography, and to analyze comparatively different opinions of the theorists who accept or deny transparency of photographs. At last, by description of realistic REALISM in photography and epistemological analysis of capabilities of this medium, it will be concluded that in realistic photography it is possible that the reality be transformed to a theory and vice versa, and this type of photography is convergence point of perceptual, critical and SCIENTIFIC REALISM.

In philosophy, the concept of truth has been always discussed through the debates about the semantic dimension and the definition of REALISM and anti-REALISM; however, none of these definitions are considered to be a complete one and none satisfies all philosopher's expectations. Most of the theories whose innovators have thought of them to be a realist, appear to be anti-realist according other philosophers. In this article a fundamental definition of REALISM is presented which is based on the approach of a philosopher. Minimalist theory of truth is a deflationary theory presented by Paul Horwich. By using minimal theoretic concepts, this theory can explain the application of the predicate "… is true". In this article three claims are investigated; first, the argument that the minimalist theory is the possible minimal theory regarding truth theories and it should be included in all theories of truth.The second claim is that if a philosopher suspects the consistency of autonomy of theoretical facts and their accessibility , his theory would be anti-REALISM, whether he intends to solve that problem or not; but, a realist philosopher doesn't see such a problem. The third claim is that if such a definition of REALISM is accepted, it shows that there is no relation between a theory of truth and REALISM; and, although this independency of the concept of truth from REALISM is correct concerning the minimalist theory of truth, but it should be accepted by realists because it can explain all the appearances and applications of truth predicate in all other definitions of REALISM.

Howard Sankey has argued that SCIENTIFIC REALISM is compatible with contingency of SCIENTIFIC theories and does not entail their inevitability. He adds that if SCIENTIFIC REALISM is strengthened by the reliability of SCIENTIFIC methods, it entails a kind of (trivial) inevitability of SCIENTIFIC theories. In this paper, we first introduce Sankey's account of SCIENTIFIC REALISM and his defense of it.Secondly, we will consider the relationship between SCIENTIFIC REALISM and the inevitability thesis from his viewpoint. We will present two critical points regarding Sankey's position. First, we shall argue that Sankey's definitions of contingency and inevitability are not proper, for he tried to develop Hacking' s definitions but he failed. Next, it will be shown that SCIENTIFIC REALISM entails the reliability theory and therefore these two cannot be separated. In the final section of this paper, a comprehensive framework will be presented to categorize different approaches to the debate of contingency/inevitability in the philosophy of science. In the next step, the relationship between SCIENTIFIC REALISM and inevitabilism within this framework will be discussed. It will be argued that SCIENTIFIC REALISM entails a non-trivial version of inevitabilism. The kind and strength of this entailment depends on whether one accepts methodological pluralism or not.